What about the future?

Africa uncontrollable population growth

Population growth rates continue to pose lingering challenges to development efforts on the continent. The population of Africa is expected to roughly double by 2050. This will add 1.2 billion people to Africa’s 2019 population of 1.3 billion people..

What’s driving population growth on the continent, and what can be done to slow the trend, is one of the subjects that will be addressed this week at the 8^th African Popùlation Conference in Entebbe in Uganda. A focus of the debate will be the role of behavioural nudges – interventions designed to change people’s behaviour – and incentives in achieving demographic transition in Africa.

On the table will be the question: can, and should, incentives and nudges be used to effect changes in fertility patterns on the continent? Some of the issues that will be considered include: the ethical implications of incentivising behaviour; whether incentives and nudges work, and under what conditions; which specific incentives and nudges are recommended; who incentives should target, and why.

These questions can best be answered by considering the key drivers of population growth in Africa. The main one is high fertility which is driven by multiple factor, including high desired family size, low levels of use of modern contraceptives, and high levels of adolescent childbearing.

The drivers

The average woman in Africa today has about 4.7 children. This varies significantly from 2.5 in southern Africa to between 5.5 and 5.8 in central and western Africa. The average in other parts of the world is 2.2 or less, with a global average of 2.5 children per woman.

One of the reasons women in Africa still have so many children is that the average age at which they become mothers for the first time is more than 4 years earlier than the global average of 26. And adolescent birth rates are very high. In central and western Africa, for example, it is almost three times the global average.

The role that an early start in childbearing plays in rapid population growth is generally ignored. This is a mistake because of its multiple effects in increasing population growth. For example, it directly affects fertility through increased duration of exposure to the risk of childbearing.

It also has indirect effects. Firstly, women who start childbearing earlier may have less capacity to decide on, or negotiate, their reproductive outcomes. They may also lack opportunities such as formal education, because it competes with childbearing.

Secondly, the early onset of childbearing leads to shorter inter-generational gaps. This is defined as the age difference between mothers and daughters. This compounds population growth rates.

Delaying the start of marriage and childbearing – which largely occur together in most African countries – could significantly reduce the rate of population growth. This would be the case even without any change in fertility behaviours.

Another driver revolves around family planning.

About one in four women on the continent have an unmet need for family planning. Unmet need refers to the proportion of sexually active women who want to stop – or delay childbearing for at least two years – but are not using any modern contraceptive methods. Supporting women to achieve their fertility intentions can significantly reduce population growth.

There’s also evidence that half of the differences in fertility between countries in sub-Saharan Africa and other regions is due to differences in family planning programme efforts and social settings. Changing social settings can significantly improve the impact of making contraceptives more available in reducing population growth.

Ways in which social settings can be changed include providing support for family planning as well as community-based distribution of contraceptive services. Making family planning services available can stimulate use of such services even among disadvantages poor, illiterate and rural women.

Addressing these gaps can help meet women’s needs in Africa and significantly slow population growth rates on the continent.

The debates about nudges

Globally, efforts to support changes in individual reproductive behaviour have emphasised the value of individual choice. But in some instances, attempts have been made to induce changes in fertility behaviour through different incentives – and disincentives.

At the extreme are coercive policies. Examples include the one child policy in China and involuntary sterilisation of mainly poor women in India. But most of the attempts at (dis)incentivising fertility behaviours are more subtle. They can include financial disincentives and incentives to promote family planning or paying for performance to improve the delivery and uptake of family planning. In some countries, such as Kenya, Malawi and Zambia, cash transfer programmes have been tried.

Other attempts, largely nudges, aim to influence fertility behaviour without forbidding any previously available courses of actions, or making alternatives appreciably more costly in terms of time, money, or social sanctions. These interventions also don’t deny individuals freedom of choice.

Using financial incentives and nudges to effect changes are not without concerns. Ethics, for example, are a big issue and continue to be debated.

The fact that high fertility behaviours are rooted in strongly held religious and cultural beliefs and narratives needs to be taken into account by those in authority.

Another ethical issue is around economics of incentives. Incentives can affect differently the decisions that poor and rich families make. It’s therefore important not to impose interventions that force people into impossible situations, as was the case in India.

Governments also face ethical dilemmas because of the contradiction between ensuring protection of the rights of individuals to decide on the number of children to have, and protecting the welfare of the larger community and achieving national development goals that may require slower population growth rates.

It’s imperative that African policy makers use interventions that are effective, practical and ethically sound. Contextual information should be sought before implementing incentive-based – and potentially controversial – programmes.
Source:
https://theconversation.com/whats-driving-africas-population-growth-and-what-can-change-it-126362

Congo: 
the colonial history produced two very different countries

In the Congolese region, colonial history produced two very differente countries. On the one hand the Republique du Congo,, on the other hand the Republique Democratique du Congo, known for a short period as Republique Zaire.

While the much larger Republique Democratique du Congo was colonized by the Belges, and practically was treated as a personal property by King Leopold of Belgium, the smaller Republique du Congo was colonized by the French, and probably because of the important role of a explorer and first French commissioner, Pierre Savorgnan de Brazza, became a much more organized society, before and after independence. Precisely because of that, on the RDC side Leopoldville became Kinshasa and on the RC side, Brazzaville did not change its name.

In present time, after half a century of independence, “Brazzaville and Kinshasa, which stare each other down from opposite banks of the Congo River, are famed as the two national capitals closest to one another, but they are hardly sister cities.

The streets of Kinshasa are a disaster, and whatever colonial-era grid there ever was has been submerged beneath a layer of mud, grime and neglect. Packs of young men fight their way into crude minibuses with holes drilled in the sides for ventilation, while in Brazzaville shiny green taxis cruise clean streets, gliding to a stop for their fares.

On hot days, Kinshasa reeks of fermenting fruit and urine. In Brazzaville, the whiff of freshly baked croissants creeps from under the doors of the city’s patisseries, as people in smart suits and enviable shoes sip café au lait. Brazzaville’s relative prosperity is due to oil money and the country’s small population, estimated at three million, with about a third in the capital.

It is here that the statue of Mr. Brazza towers over town, the pose inspired by a famous photograph of the explorer wearing a Lawrence of Arabia outfit.

And this may be just the beginning. Mr. Kamba, the head of the Brazza Foundation, wants a Brazza library, a Brazza traveling exhibit, even a Brazza theme park.

He remembered with a smile the soiree in October, when the bones were returned from Algeria — where Mr. Brazza had retired — and top diplomats gathered to swig Champagne and eat crepes.

“It was huge,” he said. “And the party didn’t end until dawn.”

Partially reproduced from The New York Times.

Why Africa loves China

Contrary to what the West believes, Africans do not see themselves as victims of Chinese economic exploitation.

Chinese President Xi Jinping and African leaders clap during a group photo session during the FOCAC Summit in Beijing, China, September 3, 2018 [File: How Hwee Young/Reuters]

At the September 2018 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing, African Union Chairperson and Rwandan President Paul Kagame lauded the Chinese aid and investment strategy in Africa as a source of "deep transformation" Kagame argued that the cooperation between China and Africa is based on mutual respect and is for the benefit of both partners. This sentiment is perhaps shared by most African heads of states and governments if their attendance of the summit is anything to go by.

However, despite the African leadership's embrace of China as a valued partner, the view that Beijing is a "predatory" actor in Africa, attempting to recolonise the continent is also ubiquitous in foreign policy circles, media narratives and academia.

Africa sees China differently than the West

The China-Africa relationship is currently being interpreted through two diametrically opposed perceptions.

The first of the two is a Sino-phobic one, mostly adopted in the West. For instance, in a recent policy briefing at the Heritage Foundation, US National Security Adviser John Bolton criticised China's actions in Africa and claimed the continent has fallen victim to Beijing's new colonialism. "China uses bribes, opaque agreements, and the strategic use of debt to hold states in Africa captive to Beijing's wishes and demands," Bolton said.

"Such predatory actions are sub-components of broader Chinese strategic initiatives, including 'One Belt, One Road' - a plan to develop a series of trade routes leading to and from China with the ultimate goal of advancing Chinese global dominance."

Just like the US, other western governments, such as the UK and France, also see China's engagement in Africa as a cause for concern. For them, China is a spoiler of peace in oil-rich countries such as South Sudan and Sudan, and a supporter of despots in African countries, such as Gabon. Moreover, they perceive China as a resource and energy-hungry giant, an exploiter of corrupt and incompetent governments, a trade opportunist, and a massive polluter of the African environment.

The second and opposing perception of the partnership between Beijing and Africa is a pro-China one. This view is adopted mostly in Africa.

According to the proponents of this narrative, China is a saviour - a trustworthy ally of Africa. They view China, a country that does not have a history of colonial aspirations in Africa, as a partner which could provide much-needed funding without any strings attached. They also believe Beijing understands and respects Africa's priorities.

Moreover, China has a reputation among African countries for being an actor that respects other cultures and states. This view is widely held by many African heads of state. 

Much of the academic literature on the China-Africa partnership unjustifiably perpetuates the Sino-phobic narrative. The media also wrongly portrays China as a predatory actor in Africa. For instance, while it is widely reported that China invests more in the extractive industry than in other sectors, the fact that the extractive industry amounts only to one third of the total Chinese investment in Africa is barely mentioned. 

The other two-thirds of China's investment in Africa is in infrastructure, construction, electricity production, manufacturing and finance. In fact, compared with the US and other developed countries, China's share in extractive investments in Africa, in the form of mining, for example, is lower.

Africa is not a victim of Chinese 'colonisation'

The Sino-phobic narrative championed by the West portrays African nations as passive collaborators, as mere victims of a second "colonisation" wave. However, this is not the case.

Africans are well aware of the shortcomings of Chinese assistance and business in Africa - from an imbalance in trade to hefty debt, from poor quality goods to corrupt practices. Africans also know that many Chinese investors lack considerations of sustainability and that some business dealings are in some instances incompatible with the national interests of African countries. Furthermore, Africans recognise that Chinese businesses rarely fight corrupt practices and seek to avoid accountability.  

Africans expect China to take some responsibility for some of these shortcomings, but also acknowledge that the weaknesses of African regulatory and enforcement mechanisms, as well as self-serving governments, are the main culprits. They know that Chinese companies, like many others, exploit the weaknesses of African states for their advantage. They believe it is their own governments, and not China, that need to make sure Africa is not exploited. 

As a result, Africans see the Western criticisms of the China-Africa cooperation with serious reservations. At the FOCAC meeting in September, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa summarised the African position by saying that Africa "refutes the view that a new colonialism is taking hold in Africa as our detractors would have us believe."

Why Africa loves China 

The debt trap is not an inevitable outcome of loans: As President Kagame said, the outcome "depends on us Africans". The key factor that determines the success of Chinese loans to Africa is whether or not African governments use such loans for productive capital investment. For these investments to succeed, African governments need to be accountable to the people of Africa. This is not the responsibility of China or any other non-African country, for that matter; rather it is Africans who are responsible to ensure accountability. 

There are some obvious reasons that make China a preferred partner for Africa. For Africans, China has four major attractions: Unconditional soft loans and access to capital; quick delivery of services and cheap goods; funding of peacekeeping; and an alternative development model. 

First, China's unconditional cooperation has allowed African governments to enjoy access to finance, expertise and development aid. In 2016, the trade between China and Africa reached $128bn, a drastic surge from $1bn in 1980.

At FOCAC in Beijing this year, China offered $60bn for development financing until 2021. While the financial crises in the US and EU limited their investments in Africa, China commited to investing more in the continent.

Chinese soft loans have enabled many African governments to avoid pressure from global governance institutions such as IMF and World Bank to meet Western norms of accountability and conditionality related to political and economic reforms, such as the infamous structural adjustment that does not always serve the interest of Africans.

Second, China has aided African governments to meet their people's rapidly growing demands for services and infrastructure more quickly. Many people in Africa are now used to quick delivery of services - such as transportation, education, health and telecommunication - by Chinese companies. This has created, and will continue to create, more appetite for Chinese business in Africa.

Third, China is now also engaged in peace and security projects in Africa. Chinese troops participate in eight UN peacekeeping missions of which five are in Africa. Moreover, China is the second largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping missions and it also contribute funding to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the IGAD South Sudan mediation. 

Fourth, China's history of fast and successful economic growth is a model from which many lessons could be learned in Africa. China's capacity to ensure policy sovereignty remains relevant, and highly attractive to African leaders and scholars. According to the World Bank, in about 40 years, China has lifted about 00 million people out of poverty through its untraditional path of development. Notably, it has achieved many of the Millennium Development Goals. 

Africans should take a page from China's playbook on development and sovereignty. They can keep their home in order and also make the best out of the competition between great powers and regional players whether they they are from the West, Far East or the Middle East.

As things stand, China is already winning the hearts and the minds of Africans. The West will have to either change tact or forever play catch up.

by Mehari Taddele Maru

From: Aljazeera.com

Colonial history produced two very different countries

In the Congolese region, colonial history produced two very differente countries. On the one hand the Republique du Congo,, on the other hand the Republique Democratique du Congo, known for a short period as Republique Zaire.

While the much larger Republique Democratique du Congo was colonized by the Belges, and practically was treated as a personal property by King Leopold of Belgium, the smaller Republique du Congo was colonized by the French, and probably because of the important role of a explorer and first French commissioner, Pierre Savorgnan de Brazza, became a much more organized society, before and after independence. Precisely because of that, on the RDC side Leopoldville became Kinshasa and on the RC side, Brazzaville did not change its name.

In present time, after half a century of independence, “Brazzaville and Kinshasa, which stare each other down from opposite banks of the Congo River, are famed as the two national capitals closest to one another, but they are hardly sister cities.

The streets of Kinshasa are a disaster, and whatever colonial-era grid there ever was has been submerged beneath a layer of mud, grime and neglect. Packs of young men fight their way into crude minibuses with holes drilled in the sides for ventilation, while in Brazzaville shiny green taxis cruise clean streets, gliding to a stop for their fares.

On hot days, Kinshasa reeks of fermenting fruit and urine. In Brazzaville, the whiff of freshly baked croissants creeps from under the doors of the city’s patisseries, as people in smart suits and enviable shoes sip café au lait. Brazzaville’s relative prosperity is due to oil money and the country’s small population, estimated at three million, with about a third in the capital.

It is here that the statue of Mr. Brazza towers over town, the pose inspired by a famous photograph of the explorer wearing a Lawrence of Arabia outfit.

And this may be just the beginning. Mr. Kamba, the head of the Brazza Foundation, wants a Brazza library, a Brazza traveling exhibit, even a Brazza theme park.

He remembered with a smile the soiree in October, when the bones were returned from Algeria — where Mr. Brazza had retired — and top diplomats gathered to swig Champagne and eat crepes.

“It was huge,” he said. “And the party didn’t end until dawn.”

Partially reproduced from The New York Times.